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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:




Years ago, I published Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution in Wisconsin Law Review.
Arriving in the early years of the deformalization movement, Fairness
and Formality sounded a warning about the risks this conflict resolution
approach poses for disempowered disputants.  Coming on the heels of an
article in the same vein by Owen Fiss, Fairness & Formality attracted atten-
tion in part because its message ran counter to the prevailing ideology, ac-
cording to which alternative dispute resolution is superior in many respects
to the in-court variety—cheaper, faster, and friendlier, particularly for the
uninitiated.
Soon, however, large controlled studies showed that minorities, women,
and the poor achieved better results when they took their cases to court
rather than to a mediator, arbitrator, or other informal intermediary, even
allowing for the higher costs of a formal proceeding.
These considerations did little to slow the rush to ADR, especially
mandatory arbitration, which spread rapidly via small-print clauses in-
serted in contracts setting up a host of relationships, including college
loans, medical services, and information technology.  I show how this hap-
pened, how it disadvantaged ordinary people, and why a new generation of
scholarship needs to examine the risks associated with disputing mecha-
nisms that limit one’s access to court.
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INTRODUCTION
YEARS ago, an article in the Wisconsin Law Review1 sounded acautionary note about the growing resort to alternative disputeresolution (ADR), including mediation, arbitration, neighbor-
hood justice centers, and restorative justice.2 Co-authored by a junior
faculty member3 and four students,4 the article posited that with dispu-
1. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1359–62 (1985) [hereinafter
Fairness and Formality].
2. For other work in this vein, see Lindsay Goldbrum, Note, Suspended Sentence
Contingent upon Participation in Victim Offender Mediation for Juveniles Who Commit
Violent Crimes, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 391, 392–94 (2017); Lisa G. Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 111–13 (1984). See also Richard Delgado, ADR and
the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement, 13 L. & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 145, 145–46 (1988) [hereinafter Recent Books] (listing these types of ADR and a
few others). For a study of the restorative justice movement, see Richard Delgado, Prose-
cuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community, and Justice. Goodbye to Hammurabi,
Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751–55 (2000)
[hereinafter Goodbye to Hammurabi] (noting that the movement, “which sprang up in the
mid-1970s as a reaction to the perceived excesses of harsh retribution, features an active
role for the victims of crime, required community service or some other form of restitution
for offenders, and face-to-face mediation in which victims and offenders confront each
other in an effort to understand each other’s common humanity”).
3. Namely this author. For a different 30-year retrospective offering a much more
upbeat assessment of the ADR movement, see generally Lela Love & Ellen Waldman, The
Hopes and Fears of All the Years: 30 Years Behind and the Road Ahead for the Widespread
Use of Mediation, 31 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123 (2016) [hereinafter Hopes and
Fears].
4. Namely Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, and David Hubbert.
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tants of unequal status, alternative dispute resolution was likely to lead to
worse outcomes for the weaker parties than the ones they were apt to
secure in formal, in-court proceedings.5
In particular, when a disputant of minority race confronted an adver-
sary such as a corporation, a white person, or an authority figure of some
kind, the danger of a result tinged by bias would be greater in ADR than
when such a plaintiff took his or her case to a court.6 And the same would
hold true, we posited, for women divorcing a high-status male such as a
business executive,7 or, indeed, for anyone of a lower social status than
his or her adversary.8
Employing social science evidence, the article explained why results
like these were to be expected.9 Subsequently, large-scale empirical stud-
ies confirmed the article’s prediction.10 Divorcing women, for example,
tended to secure more favorable support payments and child custody or-
ders when they litigated rather than mediated their divorces.11 The same
was true for small-court claimants,12 as well as for those engaged in settle-
ment conferences.13
5. Even allowing for the additional expense of adjudication. See Fairness and Formal-
ity, supra note 1, at 1359–61, 1402.
6. Id. at 1359–60, 1387–91, 1398–1404.
7. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) [hereinafter Process Dangers]. See also LINDA BABCOCK & SARA
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003).
8. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1549–51 (giving reasons why mediation and other
nonformal dispute resolution forums expose women to the risk of unfair treatment). A
prime example would be a consumer seeking recourse from a large marketer, or manufac-
turer, or an employee pursuing a workplace claim against a large corporation. See also Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2172–77 (1993) (noting
that alternative dispute resolution may operate to the detriment of the poor).
9. See infra text and notes 47–57, explaining the thesis. See also Richard Delgado,
Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1405 (1997)
[hereinafter Conflict as Pathology] (applying the author’s fairness-and-formality thesis to
explain ADR’s focus on creating peace).
10. Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender
on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & SOC. REV. 767,
776–89 (1996) (noting that small-stakes litigants who opted for mediation by trained
mediators often received lower awards—especially if they were minorities or women—
than ones who opted for a conventional trial); Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender
& Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in the Metrocourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 211, 222, 248–90 (1999) [hereinafter Negotiated Justice] (noting that white disputants
made higher initial demands than minority disputants did when the opposing party was of
minority race). See also Oren Gazal-Ayal & Ronen Perry, Imbalances of Power in ADR:
The Impact of Representation and Dispute Resolution Method on Case Outcomes, 39 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 791 (2014). See also infra Part II (discussing these studies).
11. See LaFree & Rack, supra note 10, at 769–70, 776–81. See also Penelope E. Bryan,
Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992)
[hereinafter Killing Softly] (analyzing how divorce mediation poses process problems for
women). The above holds true even allowing for the slightly higher costs of in-court adjudi-
cation, since the outcomes in the two types of proceedings differ so markedly. See id.
12. Oren Gazal-Ayal, supra note 10, at 791 (based on a large field study of such courts
in Israel).
13. See Michael Z. Green, Negotiating While Black, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REF-
ERENCE ch. 41 (Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, eds., DRI Press
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Coming on the heels of a prominent article in the same vein by Owen
Fiss,14 the article earned a favorable response, especially among the aca-
demic left.15 Shortly afterward, however, something interesting hap-
pened. One might think that alternative resolution for disputes
presenting imbalances like the ones just described would drop in popular-
ity, at least among disempowered people. After all, why would anyone
choose the less promising of two competing alternatives? In fact, the re-
verse happened. Alternative dispute resolution, particularly arbitration
and mediation, grew steadily in popularity to the point where they now
dominate their respective fields.16 Using a prize-winning movie, The Un-
bearable Lightness of Being,17 as a point of departure, I show how this
2017). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing
against the practice of coercive settlement as contrary to our fundamental values).
14. See Fiss, supra note 13.
15. Cited over 425 times in the Westlaw database for law reviews and journals,
downloaded on SSRN almost as often, and noted in all the major casebooks, Fairness and
Formality is probably among the most widely discussed civil procedure articles of its time.
See Fairness and Formality, supra note 1.
16. See infra Part II. On how the practice of inserting mandatory arbitration clauses in
commercial agreements of many kinds originated, see Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael
Corkery, Sued Over Old Debt, and Blocked From Suing Back, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/business/dealbook/sued-over-old-debt-and-blocked-
from-suing-back.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/B7SD-YQNY] (describing how the
“strategy traces to a pair of Supreme Court decisions in 2011 and 2013 that enshrined the
use of class-action bans in arbitration clauses,” and describing how “debt collectors have
pushed the parameters of that legal strategy into audacious new territory”). Other indus-
tries have followed suit with nearly the same alacrity, including auto sales and financing of
all types, including consumer credit. Id. See also infra text and note 146 (describing how
this practice originated in a series of high-level meetings among defense lawyers represent-
ing mega-corporate clients). On the growth and expansion of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, see generally CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ADVERSARIAL MODEL]. See also Jacque-
line Nolan-Haley, Mediation and Access to Justice in Africa: Perspectives from Ghana, 21
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 59, 61 (2016) (noting that mediation can spread corporate capital-
ism to new realms). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Variations in the Uptake of and Re-
sistance to Mediation Outside of the United States, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2014 189,
189–221 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2015) (noting that some countries, particularly ones in
Africa, resist the introduction of mediation into their culture and dispute resolution sys-
tems). But see Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 134 (noting that it is spreading globally
with little resistance). Mediation has even caught on in educational disputes over appropri-
ate programs for the disabled in public schools. See Katherine McMurtrey, The IDEA and
the Use of Mediation and Collaborative Dispute Resolution in Due Process Disputes, 2016 J.
DISP. RESOL. 187, 191 (2016), but noting that it has been only partly successful. Id. at 198.
On the relative lack of criticism of the ADR movement, see, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1056–57 (1996) [hereinafter
Critics Gone?] (noting the declining quality and quantity of serious scholarship critiquing
deformalized justice and attributing this to “a larger mosaic of efficiency reform measures
implemented to restrict court access and expedite case dispositions,” including: plausibility
pleading standards, “‘Rocket Dockets’, Rule 11 sanctions, lower summary judgment
thresholds, [and] reduced discovery”). On the unsuitability of ADR for the resolution of
civil rights disputes, see Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1987); in the realm of
family law, see Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443
(1992).
17. THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (The Saul Zaentz Company 1988) [here-
inafter UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS] (starring Daniel-Day Lewis and Juliette Binoche).
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may have happened. After describing the film,18 I summarize the Wiscon-
sin article and its critique of ADR.19 Then, I review empirical studies of
alternative dispute resolution that examined outcomes for disparities
when one of the disputants is a person of lesser standing than his or her
adversary.20
I next examine how ADR grew rapidly in two settings, divorce media-
tion and commercial arbitration, and how the two may have been con-
nected.21 I then examine recent feminist scholarship on vulnerability and
show how our response to it in a setting such as dispute resolution can
lead to two outcomes, only one of which is socially desirable.22 A final
section offers cautions for reformers who might be inclined to treat the
critique of ADR lightly—requiring, at most, a minor correction—failing
to notice that the United States is in the early stages of a broad trend
toward inequality of which deformalization is just one part.23
I. THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being,24 Tomas, a doctor played by
Daniel Day-Lewis, and Tereza, a sweet-faced barmaid played by Juliette
Binoche, meet, fall in love, go through turbulent times, find peace in a
rustic idyll, and die in a tragic accident. Set in 1960’s revolutionary-era
Prague and based on a novel by Milan Kundera,25 the film traces the lives
of the above-mentioned pair and a second woman, Sabina. Sabina, played
by Lena Olin, is a successful and highly libidinous artist who wears a
bowler hat when she is in the mood, which she often is when in the pres-
ence of Tomas and other good-looking men. Tomas is a successful brain
surgeon, charismatic, and an unrepentant lothario who beds a succession
of women, including the primary two. Sabina holds his main affections
during the opening scenes, along with a succession of nurses, secretaries,
apartment-dwelling society women, and others with whom he has brief
flings.
Tereza, however, with her youthful innocence and fresh-faced looks,
soon wins his main attention, which at times approaches ninety percent.26
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV. See also Richard Delgado, Foreword: Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: A Critical Reconsideration, 70 SMU L. REV. 595 (2017) [hereinafter Critical Reconsid-
eration]  (introducing a symposium on this subject).
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See supra note 17.
25. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (Heim trans., Peren-
nial Classics ed. 1999) (1984).
26. He is constantly finding excuses to step out from their apartment and not always to
perform brain surgery. The soulful beauty, Tereza, would much have preferred that he
devoted one hundred percent of his affection toward her, and suffers untold agonies when
she comes across unmistakable evidence that he does not. Unfortunately, Tomas, at least at
this stage of his development, prefers “lightness” and is incapable of playing doctor with
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They move in together, she takes up photography,27 and he performs op-
erations on a succession of patients, including a farmer who owns an en-
gaging little pig that follows him around as he heals from his operation
and who turns out to play an important part in the couple’s subsequent
lives.28
Tereza and Tomas’s big-city idyll comes to an end when, during one of
Tomas’s frequent, unexplained absences from their love nest, Tereza no-
tices that the furniture is vibrating slightly and that a distant humming
sound is increasing in volume.29 Dashing to the street, she finds herself in
the middle of a harrowing scene. A Russian tank, bearing a large red star
and a protruding cannon, is slowly rumbling down the narrow alleyway in
front of the charmingly dilapidated apartment where she and Tomas live.
Many of their neighbors soon follow, and the gathering crowd quickly
realize that they are witnessing the early stages of a military overthrow of
their government.30 Pandemonium ensues. Several of the bystanders
throw rocks at the invading force, others hold up signs telling the Rus-
sians to go home, and the tanks begin pointing their weapons this way
and that.31 A few shots ring out and, luckily for Tereza, Tomas returns
just in time to guide her to shelter in an empty doorway. When the tanks
have passed, they proceed to the city’s main square, where a massive
demonstration is taking place.
Having had the presence of mind to bring her camera, Tereza takes
picture after picture of the action, and, after the demonstration ends, the
couple find their way home safely. Over the next few days, bound by
connubial solidarity, as well as loyalty to their country, the two lovers
carry out separate actions that depart from their characteristic “light-
ness.” Realizing that she cannot publish her photographs in Czechoslova-
kia—the Russians now control everything, including the newspapers—
Tereza entrusts the negatives to one of many refugees fleeing for the
safety of Switzerland.
For his part, Tomas, whose previous life has demonstrated even more
“lightness”—a metaphor for a carefree, happy spirit—than Tereza’s,
just one woman at a time. Does he love Tereza? Yes, but he is irresistibly drawn to other
women as well, and has trouble resisting the lure of a pretty face.
27. At the suggestion of Sabina, whom she meets when Tomas introduces the two
women to each other.
28. The farmer offers them jobs on his farm after the two are expelled from their jobs
in Prague.
29. The camera and the film take on a dark character at this point, which the film
editor accomplishes by introducing black-and-white or sepia-toned footage of the actual
revolutionary scenes from archives of this period.
30. This is the actual setting of Kundera’s novel, which opens in pre-1968 revolution-
ary times, when Czech liberty, freedom, and the arts had reached their apogee. Kundera,
supra note 25.
31. See UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS, supra note 17. Some of the photography in the en-
suing scenes is from newsreels from the times, most of it in black-and-white.
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turns to essay-writing. Intrigued by the story of Oedipus Rex,32 which he
has learned from the more literarily-minded Tereza, he composes a
scorching essay and gets it past the editor of a local newspaper, which
publishes it for all to see. In it, Tomas ridicules his countrymen, who have
made their peace with the new ham-fisted rulers. Accustomed to living
lightly and indulging his every whim, Tomas does not take kindly to the
boorish Russians. His clever letter castigates his fellow Czechs, who col-
laborate with the new regime in hopes of leading near-normal lives.33 But
his letter is indirect and allegorical so that the editor lets it through or,
perhaps, misses its point. The Russians do not, however, so that when it
appears in print, the two of them are marked targets. Tomas is called in
for interrogation, loses his medical license, and decides to join the long
line of refugees leaving Czechoslovakia, accompanied by the loyal Tereza.
For her part, Tereza has received an even greater shock. Accompany-
ing Tomas to his interrogation, she finds herself in a large hall with doz-
ens of her countrymen waiting to face questioning from unsmiling
Russian apparatchiks seated at a front table.34 She is astonished to find
large blow-ups of her photographs, published in foreign newspapers,
taped to the walls behind the inquisitors. The Russians have circled the
protesters who have recognizable faces and printed their names just be-
low them. These are her very friends and neighbors who are lined up next
to her, facing an inquisition for their participation in the demonstration
that fateful day.35
It appears that her journalistic instincts have backfired. She had
snapped her pictures and given the prints to a fleeing countryman in
hopes of bringing an outrageous event to light. But the authorities put
them to an unintended use, namely to identify the brave protesters who
stood up to the tanks in the central square. Realizing that their casual
approach to life is coming to an end, Tomas and Tereza pack their posses-
sions into his small Czech-made car and head for the Swiss border.
In Geneva, Tomas and Tereza make the best of their situation. He gets
a job as a window washer, while she applies to a local newspaper for a job
as a photojournalist, specializing in wars, revolutions, and other dramatic
events. The editor tells her that they have no needs in that area—Geneva
being famously peaceful—but hires her to photograph small plants for
the garden section of the paper. Her first assignment is to take pictures of
32. By Athenian playwright Sophocles (ca. 429 B.C.), the play describes a tortured
king who unwittingly sleeps with his mother, murders his father, and upon learning what he
has done, tears out his eyes.
33. Specifically, he compares these collaborators to Oedipus. See UNBEARABLE
LIGHTNESS, supra note 17. But instead of tearing out their eyes, they live as comfortably as
possible in the new order. See Peter Fritzsche, Jackboot Germany: A New History of the
Gestapo, N.Y. TIMES (March 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/books/review/
gestapo-by-frank-mcdonough.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link unavailable] (noting that “if you
are not a designated enemy, you can live comfortably in a police state”).
34. They are interrogators, who question Czechs suspected of resisting the new
regime.
35. See supra text and note 31.
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miniature cactuses, which, being of a compliant nature, she carries out
willingly but with little enthusiasm.
Their jobs make them feel weak, and finding working-class life in Ge-
neva cheerless, they return to Prague. Tomas receives a cold reception
from his former medical colleagues, and Tereza suffers agonies when he
returns to his former faithless ways with a succession of women, including
the obliging Sabina, who welcomes him back into her studio to rekindle
their relationship and stoke her artistic fervor.
Realizing that their lives are in a downward spiral, Tomas and Tereza
seize an opportunity when one of Tomas’s former patients, the farmer
with the adorable pig, looks him up to see how he is doing. On learning of
the couple’s plight, he offers them jobs on his farm. They eagerly join him
in the country, where Tereza learns to tend crops in the field, and Tomas,
despite his slight physique, makes himself useful, repairing dislocated
shoulders and curing other ailments for the hired help.
The two enjoy their bucolic idyll, working in the sun-dappled fields and
dancing the polka on Sunday with the nearby farm folk, who seem un-
daunted by the times. Fate intervenes a second time, however, when on
the way back in a rattletrap truck from a village dance, they die in a tragic
accident on the rain-slicked country road. The movie ends when Sabina,
who has by now moved to Big Sur and resumed her artistic career, re-
ceives a letter with the news. A wealthy patron who has been in her stu-
dio watching her work mutters, “damn shame,” gives her a consoling
squeeze, and invites her to join him and his wife for dinner that evening.
Sabina is apparently entering her own period of lightness, enjoying the
life of a successful artist in a seaside town in California. The moviegoer is
left to ponder whether her future holds a fate similar to that of her for-
mer friends.36
II. FAIRNESS AND FORMALITY
A. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION—THE EARLY YEARS
My co-authors and I wrote our cautionary tale37 during the early years
of the alternative dispute resolution movement,38 as it was just beginning
to gain momentum and receive favorable reviews.39 ADR struck many
observers as a welcome antidote to costly, anxiety-inducing, and time-
consuming adjudication that often left even the winner with mixed feel-
ings about the event.40 Mediation and arbitration, in particular, appeared
to offer more humane ways of resolving disputes in which the parties
36. American society soon began turning a jaded eye on immigrants such as Sabrina.
See, e.g., 1994 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. PROP. 187 (West) (repealed Jan. 1, 2015) (discouraging
immigration by denying newcomers access to non-emergency health care, public education,
and other services in the state).
37. See Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1360–62.
38. Specifically, 1985.
39. See, e.g., ADVERSARIAL MODEL, supra note 16.
40. See id.
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could sit around a table in a small room, talking in an informal, friendly
fashion.41 No judge sat on high, scowling and issuing incomprehensible
rulings from time to time, with few if any accompanying explanations.42
The parties could tell their stories in a manner that seemed natural to
them.43 A friendly intermediary would bring the parties closer together
and help them arrive at a solution that both could accept.44 Everyone
would leave satisfied that justice was done—or that at least they managed
to tell their story and have the others listen.45 ADR was not only friend-
lier, cheaper, and faster than formal, in-court litigation,46 it was also likely
to leave the disputants on better terms than the ones they would have
enjoyed following a high-stakes, in-court judgment.47
Unfortunately, this is not what the results showed, especially when the
parties began on unequal footings.48 Today, it would be fashionable to
explain differential outcomes49 in the two systems, with the minorities
doing worse in ADR than in the formal, in-court variety, by resort to
implicit bias,50 stereotype threat,51 and unconscious52 and cognitive ra-
41. Id. But see infra text and notes 82–94 (noting that mediation presents process dan-
gers for women and other disempowered disputants).
42. See Richard Delgado, Law’s Violence: Derrick Bell’s Next Article, 75 U. PITT. L.
REV. 435, 448 (2014) (discussing “narricide”).
43. See id.
44. See ADVERSARIAL MODEL, supra note 16; ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM L. URY,
GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d
ed. 1991) (1981); Recent Books, supra note 2, at 146; Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at
135–36 (touting its ability “to bridge differences, and to build unique solutions”). Lisa A.
Rickard, The Virtues of Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/14/opinion/the-virtues-of-arbitration.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link unavailable] (pos-
iting that arbitration is cheaper than a court proceeding and often fairer, simpler, and
faster). But see Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 139–40 (citing a Rand Report that found
that mediation was not significantly speedier than ordinary litigation).
45. E.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 44. For authors sympathetic to this position, see,
e.g., ADVERSARIAL MODEL, supra note 16; William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1268–69 n.178 (1983) (touting the advan-
tages of multiple approaches to dispute resolution); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on
the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864–65, 871–873 (1990).
46. E.g., Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 125 (noting that it is also less stressful and
produces less “relational havoc”).
47. See Lerman, supra note 2, at 84; Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 445; Hopes and
Fears, supra note 3, at 127.
48. Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1402–04.
49. See supra text and note 10. See also infra Part II (discussing empirical studies
showing that minority disputants, holding other factors constant, do better in formal, in-
court adjudication than they do in the informal kind (ADR)).
50. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490–94 (2005)
(explaining implicit bias).
51. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 798–99
(1995) (explaining “stereotype threat,” which is the tendency of test subjects to perform
worse than predicted when the test conditions remind them of a social stereotype that
includes poor performance on intellectual tasks like the ones the test will require).
52. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 387–88 (1987) (noting how a great deal of
racist behavior stems from unconscious attitudes).
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cism,53—both on the part of the mediator and the parties themselves.
These defects might be countered by conscientious “power balancing,”54
more rigorous training for the mediators, and firm instructions to the par-
ties not to treat each other disrespectfully.55
The political left would attribute outcome disparities to the manner in
which deformalized justice increases the role of the state or rewards re-
peat players.56 But my co-authors and I suspected that something struc-
tural—inherent in informality itself—was at work and likely to come to
the fore in deformalized settings. If we were right, alternative dispute res-
olution carried risks for disempowered disputants that would not disap-
pear even with careful training for mediators and constant reminders to
the parties to behave.57 As when Tereza noticed the furniture trembling
slightly, we had a feeling that something was up.
We began by harkening back to the teachings of prominent social
scientists like Gunnar Myrdal who, following a visit to the United States,
published a landmark book on American society.58 Americans, Myrdal
wrote, behave as though they are ambivalent—of two minds—about
race.59 Their national ideals and founding documents hold that all per-
sons are equal moral agents under prevailing ethical codes and the Con-
stitution.60 But, because of our history, most Americans also hold, if only
implicitly, a second, lower set of values that emerge during moments of
intimacy, such as with friends or mates at a pub.61 In settings like these,
many Americans are much more likely to tell a racist story or act in a way
inimical to the prospects of a person of minority race or a woman.62
For example, on the Fourth of July, with the bands playing and Ameri-
can flags flying, most of our fellow citizens will act according to their
53. See Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1197–98
(1995) (showing how cognitive schema predispose many to see events in accord with pre-
existing dispositions).
54. By the mediator, that is. See, e.g., Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 446, 498–502, 509
(arguing that “mediator intervention does not protect the lesser pow[-]ered wife from dis-
advantageous outcomes”).
55. On power balancing, see id. at 446, 498–502.
56. See Recent Books, supra note 2, at 146–48 (attributing this critique to Richard
Hofrichter, Christine Harrington, and Goldberg, Green, and Sanders). See also Hopes and
Fears, supra note 3, at 136 (discussing the advantage that repeat players enjoy in the sys-
tem); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95, 98–101 (1974) (explaining the advantage that accrues
to repeat players).
57. See Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 137–38 (warning of the risks of heavy-
handed training that encourages mediators to exercise an undue amount of direction, such
as by adopting a pre-formed evaluative matrix or grid). See Leonard L. Riskin, Under-
standing Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 9–13 (1996).
58. E.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
59. See Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1382–84.
60. See id. at 1375–85, 1388; MYRDAL, supra note 58, at 3–5.
61. Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1382–86.
62. Id. at 1385, 1387–89.
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higher set of values.63 If they find themselves standing next to a person of
color or one whom they know to be gay, they may smile, put an arm
around the person’s shoulder, and say, “Isn’t the parade grand?” After-
ward, they may invite the person to a barbecue in their back yard with a
group of their friends.64
By the same token, jurors, witnesses, and other participants in a judi-
cial proceeding are apt to behave with scrupulous fairness, following the
judge’s instructions to the letter. The physical setting of the courtroom,
with the black-robed judge sitting on high, the state or national flag in full
display, the blindfolded lady of justice emblazoned on the front wall, and
the uniformed bailiff standing by, remind everyone that this is an occa-
sion during which they are expected to behave according to the precepts
of the American Creed.65 Studies of jury behavior tend to find that this
actually happens; even prejudiced jurors often find it within themselves to
hold their biases in abeyance during the proceedings.66
Alternative dispute resolution offers relatively few such cues. Indeed,
the comfortable setting and informal atmosphere instead provide an ideal
situation for the stronger actor to behave in his usual confident fashion
and expect the mediator to enact his wishes, as well.67 He is apt to speak
forthrightly, as though his account of things is the only possible one.68 His
body language and manner will signal to onlookers that he expects to
secure a favorable outcome. The woman or minority group member may
well sense the prevailing atmosphere with its familiar expectations and
not put his or her case forward as forcefully as it might merit.69
For social scientists, this “confrontation” (fairness-and-formality) the-
ory explains why desegregation came about so readily and with so little
resistance in the military following President Truman’s executive order.70
It also explains why minorities flock to government jobs and sports,
where civil service rules and athletic conventions set out what is to be
63. That is to say, all men and women are equal, precious children of the Creator, and
entitled to be treated with due respect. Id. (noting that situational features such as flags




66. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 497–98 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1966).
67. Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1385–88, 1394–95, 1402.
68. Id. at 1371–73, 1383–85, 1390–91.
69. Id. See also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818–19 (1991) (noting that automobile salespersons
offered women worse deals than men because they believed the women expected no better
and no standard price governed each transaction). See also Amanda Lee Myers, Honda




70. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948) (desegregating the armed
forces). The military, of course, is an authoritarian, top-down institution where everyone
knows that they are expected to obey the rules.
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done and what will count as success.71 And, as we shall see, it explains
why minorities do comparatively poorly in alternative dispute settings.72
III. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF OUTCOMES
Real-world support for our thesis was not long in arriving. Minorities
or women trying cases in court did, indeed, secure better outcomes than
ones who agreed to resolve their dispute by mediation or arbitration.73 A
large study in Bernalillo County, New Mexico is typical. In Bernalillo,
which includes Albuquerque, two investigators examined outcomes in
mediated and non-mediated disputes in a metropolitan court system.
They found substantial disparities, varying by race and gender, with mi-
nority disputants generally receiving lower settlements.74 One of the two
investigators carried out a second study using the same data as the first
and found that when a disputant of the majority race confronted an oppo-
nent who was a member of a minority group, the white party asked for,
and expected, a larger initial amount than when the opponent was
white.75 A second large study, of small claims courts in Israel (whose legal
system resembles our own), found much the same,76 as did others, differ-
ing only in the size of the disparity found.77
Formal, in-court disputing emerges, then, as superior to the informal
kind for disempowered litigants. The reader who is predisposed to favor
ADR, thinking of it as a humane, cost-saving innovation, will find these
words, to some extent, counterintuitive. They may feel, instinctively, that
ADR should be better than the furious clash of high-priced lawyers that
prevails in in-court adjudication. But it is not—it is simply easier on the
nerves and a little cheaper.78 The results are counterintuitive for a second
reason: many disputants, even those who fared poorly in an alternative
71. Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1386–89 (explaining the confrontation
theory).
72. See infra Part III.
73. E.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the
State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 721, 727–28 (1994).
74. LaFree & Rack, supra note 10, at 771–72, 783. See also ADVERSARIAL MODEL,
supra note 16, at 643 (“In my view, one of the few rigorously successful studies of compara-
bility of process is the Metro Court study of outcomes and satisfaction rates among adjudi-
cation and mediation users in New Mexico state courts.”). See also Negotiated Justice,
supra note 10, at 294–97.
75. See Negotiated Justice, supra note 10, at 250–51.
76. See generally Gazal-Ayal, supra note 10. See also Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of
Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common
Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 565–66 (1997) (noting that in cases featuring an
imbalance of power, the weaker party is vulnerable to pressures to accede to the wishes of
the stronger party and to follow the mediator’s lead).
77. E.g., Killing Softly, supra note 10, at 482–98. See also Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and
Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice Denied?, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 185, 189–93 (2011).
78. Most courtroom scenes are full of tension, with rulings coming fast and furiously.
Alternative dispute resolution appears, on the surface, to be a friendly, collaborative ven-
ture. See Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1366–67.
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proceeding, liked it.79 They would recommend it to their friends.80 The
mediator struck them as friendly and humane. They may have secured a
poor outcome, but at least “they listened to my story.”81 Never mind that
as soon as these disputants finished telling that story—perhaps to know-
ing looks, rolling eyes, and surreptitious glances at the clock—the media-
tor or arbitrator handed down a decision largely favoring the opponent.82
IV. UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: POPULARITY SOARS,
PARTICULARLY FOR MEDIATED DIVORCE
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
As with Tereza and her photographs, my co-authors and I found our
discovery being put to an unexpected use.
A. MEDIATED DIVORCE
When early commentators pointed out process dangers for women in
mediated divorce,83 it promptly became even more popular with men
seeking lower alimony awards and child support orders.84 It also retained
favor with mediators, many of whom had convinced themselves that they
were engaged in repairing relationships, reducing acrimony, and making
everyone happy—while, of course, making a little money on the side.85
Judges were pleased to get rid of the many divorce cases that were filling
79. See Conflict as Pathology, supra note 9, at 1396; ADVERSARIAL MODEL, supra note
16, at 1548–49 (discussing studies showing satisfaction with divorce mediation); Joshua D.
Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1488–89 (1994).
80. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 79.
81. See id.
82. See supra text and notes 7–9; supra Part III. See also Roy F. Baumeister et al., The
Glucose Model of Mediation: Physiological Bases of Willpower as Important Explanations
for Common Mediation Behavior, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 377, 377–78 (2015) (noting
that many mediators realize that an inexperienced or poorly nourished party is apt to flag
as the end of an afternoon of negotiating nears and accept an unfavorable award).
83. E.g., Process Dangers, supra note 7, at 1549–50, 1585–86 (noting that “people vary
greatly in the extent to which their sense of self is ‘relational’—that is, defined in terms of
connection to others”—and that many women exhibit this trait and, as a result, find high-
stakes mediation or arbitration stressful); Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 444 (noting that
the informality of mediation reinforces patriarchy “by returning men to their former domi-
nant position”).
84. See supra text and notes 14–15 (describing the increase in popularity of this avenue
of dispute resolution).
85. See Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers’ Judgment: Is Medi-
ation Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2015) (positing that training in
the techniques of mediation enables one to consider all sides of an issue). The typical medi-
ator is a part-time litigator, or retired lawyer, law professor, or judge, with the makeup and
helpful inclinations of a social worker and, sometimes, in need of the income. See Hopes
and Fears, supra note 3, at 140 (noting that some mediators are “recovering lawyers”).
Mediators and arbitrators are somewhat stratified by sex and gender, with the men han-
dling the large cases. See Gina V. Brown & Andrea K. Schneider, Gender Differences in
Dispute Resolution Practice: Report on the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Practice
Snapshot Survey, 47 AKRON L. REV. 975, 988–90 (2015).
624 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
their courtrooms with somber children, angry men, and crying women.86
At the same time, many women embraced mediated divorce, believing
that it enabled them to tell the tale of how badly their soon-to-be-ex had
behaved during their marriage.87 If mediated divorce would not help
them get the award they deserved, it would at least be cathartic.88
A new generation of mediators loved it, too. Many were disenchanted
(or retired) lawyers or judges who relished the prospect of making a little
money while taking on, essentially, the role of a social worker, trying to
bring peace to two sides at loggerheads.89 Of course, these hopes proved
largely vain.90 Frequently, the weaker party does get to tell her story, but
haltingly and with little confidence,91 lacking the financial and social-capi-
tal resources that her adversary commands and with less practice in pub-
lic speaking.92 Mediators tend to think that they are experts at “power-
balancing”93—compensating for the more powerful disputant’s confident
demeanor and assertive behavior. But they rarely succeed at this task,
since one’s own biases are, in most cases, invisible to oneself.94
B. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: “THE GUY DIDN’T REALLY LISTEN”
But the star performer for the ADR crowd was and is commercial arbi-
tration. Not only a hit with the financial industry, commercial arbitration
is also popular with marketers of dangerous products, HMOs and other
providers of medical services, the electronics industry,95 and even harried
86. See Fairness and Formality, supra note 1, at 1366–67; Recent Books, supra note 2,
at 146 (noting the docket-clearing advantages of ADR); Killing Softly, supra note 11, at
446 (noting that many divorcing women are at an emotional and financial disadvantage
during divorce proceedings); infra text and note 92.
87. Process Dangers, supra note 7, at 1610 (noting that this advantage is not decisive,
because mediation introduces a host of process dangers).
88. See id. at 1550 (noting that some women are more “relational” in their identities
and make-up than men, and thus are more prone to favor compromise over combat in
resolving differences).
89. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s
Courts, 3 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 512–18 (2015) (describing how a social-worker
attitude and approach can prove helpful). See Frenkel et al., supra note 85, at 34–35; infra
note 124. See also Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 140 (noting that some mediators are
burned-out lawyers looking for new means of support).
90. See supra Part III.
91. See Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 444–82.
92. Id. at 482–83 (noting that women are quite capable of dominance behavior, yet
many do not practice it during mediations because of guilt, anxiety, social pressures, lack of
financial resources, and sex-role ideology).
93. See supra text and note 55.
94. Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 490–514 (noting that the reasons include poor
training, overconfidence, and role conflicts). See also James Coben, Mediation’s Dirty Little
Secret: Straight Talk About Mediator Manipulation and Deception, 2 J. ALTERNATIVE DISP.
RESOL. EMP. 4, 4 (2000) (pointing out that many mediators pressure and manipulate par-
ties to produce a settlement); Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 140, 142–43.
95. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?mcubz=3
[Perma link unavailable] [hereinafter Arbitration Everywhere] (noting that “[o]ver the last
few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for a credit card, use a cellphone,
get cable or Internet service, or shop online without agreeing to private arbitration,” and
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lawyers worried that their clients might sue them.96 Loan collectors, for
the trillion dollars of unpaid student loans, found it very helpful, too.97
Each of these behemoths of the modern economy discovered that a suita-
bly drafted arbitration clause brings substantial benefits.98 It can bar class
suits.99 And it can land the dispute in front of a friendly arbitrator with
ties to the defendant or its industry, a repeat player who the arbitrator
depends on for continuing assignments.100
Commercial actors soon learned that arbitration can save them a great
deal of time and money.101 Many consumers, on learning that their com-
observing that “[b]y inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of con-
sumer and employment contracts, companies . . . devised a way to circumvent the courts
and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits, realistically the only tool
citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices”) (noting the spread to new
areas practically every month, such as funeral homes and car loans. Even small companies
are beginning to adopt the practice). See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery,
Start-Ups Embrace Arbitration to Settle Workplace Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/business/dealbook/start-ups-embrace-arbitration-to-
settle-workplace-disputes.html?mcubz [Perma link unavailable]. See also supra note 15
(describing the spread of ADR).
96. See Terese M. Schireson, Comment, The Ethical Lawyer-Client Arbitration Clause,
87 TEMP. L. REV. 547, 564–65 (2015).
97. See Gretchen Morganson, Student Victims Seek to Become Creditors in ITT Bank-
ruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/business/student-
victims-seek-to-become-creditors-in-itt-bankruptcy.html?mcubz [Perma link unavailable].
See also Schireson, supra note 96, at 548 (noting that “Arbitration clauses have become a
standard feature in form contracts including ‘credit card agreements, . . . cell phone bills,
home mortgages, and . . . other service and sales agreements’”). See also Editorial, Don’t
Force Students to Sign Away Their Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/06/10/opinion/dont-force-students-to-sign-away-their-rights.html?mcubz [Perma
link unavailable (noting the common practice of including arbitration clauses in documents
setting up student loans).
98. See Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95. See also Jessica Silver-Greenberg &
Michael Corkery, Efforts to Rein in Arbitration Come Under Well-Financed Attack, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/business/dealbook/efforts-to-
rein-in-arbitration-come-under-well-financed-attack.html [https://perma.cc/ZPV6-LW2W]
(noting that the home mortgage and finance industry strongly embraces the tactic). Even
legislators and employers looking for inexpensive foreign guest workers find the idea at-
tractive. But see Annie Smith, Imposing Injustice: The Prospect of Mandatory Arbitration
for Guestworkers, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 375 (2016) (deploring the idea). See
also Theresa M. Beiner, The Many Lanes out of Court: Against Privatization of Employ-
ment Discrimination Disputes, 73 MD. L. REV. 837, 838–40 (2014) (noting the rise of ADR
in employment discrimination disputes).
99. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95 (noting that following two business-friendly
Supreme Court decisions endorsing arbitration “judges upheld class-action bans in 134 out
of 162 cases,” and that many other consumers were deterred from even filing a lawsuit).
See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–48 (2011) (upholding a fine-print
contract that obliged consumers to arbitrate their cases one by one); Am. Express v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12 (2013).
100. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95 (calling arbitrators generally “friendly” to
business interests); Silver-Greenberg, supra note 98 (noting that arbitrators are often busi-
ness-friendly). See also Galanter, supra note 56, at 97–101 (explaining the advantage of
being a repeat player).
101. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95. See also Sam Hananel, Justices Will Weigh
Limits on Worker Rights to Sue Employers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://
apnews.com/5205b448f26f4996985d367b6a155798/justices-will-weigh-limits-worker-rights-
sue-employers [https://perma.cc/3B4H-QJHF] (noting that the National Labor Relations
Board takes the position that arbitration agreements that prevent workers from filing class
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plaint can only be heard in front of an arbitrator, will decline to pro-
ceed.102 Torts, contract breaches, and medical malpractice will go
unredressed.103 Manufacturers of dangerous products and merchants who
market shoddy goods online can escape liability for corner-cutting prac-
tices104 by merely taking the precaution of inserting an agreement to arbi-
trate into the document setting up their relationship with the
consumer.105 The world becomes safer for the more empowered party,
but much more dangerous for everyone else.
As in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, merchants enter a world of
lightness, joy, and irresponsibility in which they can get away with almost
anything because of the small-print arbitration clause they have placed in
their form contracts. Like Tomas, they can do what they want with little
fear that others will call them to account. As for the public, just as hap-
pened in the world of war-torn Prague, which turned gray or sepia-toned
once the Russian boors took over, citizens entered into a new era in
which they have to get used to life with no representation and little op-
portunity for redress.106
C. BUYER’S REMORSE
Tomas came to regret his Oedipus Rex essay.107 But his chagrin was
only that of the pleasure-seeker who realizes that something he has done
will interfere with his next bacchanal. Tereza’s remorse was deeper and
more shocking. After she photographed the scenes of righteous revolut-
actions for job-related grievances violate labor laws that give workers the right to conduct
joint action for redress of their grievances).
102. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95. See also Hiro N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously
Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?, 91 IND. L.J. 1143 (2016) (an-
swering no).
103. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95. See Editorial, Nursing Home Residents Still
Vulnerable to Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/
opinion/nursing-home-residents-still-vulnerable-to-abuse.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link un-
available] (noting that “[p]rospective patients do not have the necessary information to
make a decision about signing the clauses”). See also Rickard, supra note 44 (observing
that the Kaiser Health Plan requires that members agree to arbitration and believes that
this is in their best interest); Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A Nursing
Home Murder and a Family’s Arbitration Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/business/dealbook/pivotal-nursing-home-suit-raises-a-simple-ques
tion-who-signed-the-contract.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link unavailable] (noting the use of
arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts).
104. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95.
105. See supra notes 100–104.
106. But see Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule on Arbitration Would
Restore Right to Sue Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/
05/business/dealbook/consumer-agency-moves-to-assert-bank-customers-right-to-sue.html
[https://perma.cc/PQ7C-SAKR] (noting that “[t]he nation’s consumer watchdog is un-
veiling a proposed rule” to curb some of the abovementioned abuses and “restore a con-
sumer’s rights to bring class-action lawsuits against financial firms”). The pioneer of the
strategy of mandatory arbitration clauses, Alan S. Kaplinsky, gloomily predicted that “[i]t’s
going to spell the end of arbitration.” Id. The agency’s rule “would be the first significant
check on arbitration since a pair of Supreme Court decisions in 2011 and 2013 blessed its
widespread use.” Id. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was expected to mount strong oppo-
sition to the new rule. Id.
107. See supra text and notes 32–33.
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ionaries defending their country’s honor in the face of advancing Soviet
tanks, she believed that the negatives that she entrusted to her fleeing
countryman would help bring justice.108 Surely, readers everywhere, see-
ing the Soviet barbarians and the popular uprising they sparked, would
clamor for justice.109 They would demand that their own governments, or
perhaps the United Nations, do something about it.
Tereza was mortified that nothing like this happened. The world was
silent. The Russians quickly installed themselves in power with little ef-
fective resistance. Their henchmen used her photographs to identify and
punish her friends and wipe out the last vestiges of resistance.110
As with the authors of Fairness and Formality, she sought to bring an
injustice to light. Instead, she ended up enabling the invaders to crush the
opposition.111 In similar fashion, legions of divorcing women, students
burdened by intolerable debt, workers saddled with unfair working con-
ditions, medical patients, and consumers injured by careless manufactur-
ers are worse off for our having drawn attention to a weakness that their
adversaries can, with a little advance planning, exploit.112 We imagined
ourselves as sounding an alarm, coming to their aid, helping them avoid
an untenable situation—all classic tasks for lawyers and legal scholars
working for social justice.113 Surely, courts, legislators, and the organized
bar would respond appropriately.
V. VULNERABILITY: A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR
PROCEDURAL CRITICS
Or so we thought. In recent years, scholars like Martha Fineman have
been calling attention to vulnerability as a new approach to protecting
women, children, minorities, the disabled, and others from harm at the
hands of caregivers and others.114 Focusing on that feature, scholars con-
tend, can circumvent the limitations of traditional review—under equal
protection, for example, with its many tiers of review and incongruous
limits, such as the requirement of state action, intent, and straight-line
causation.115
108. See supra text and notes 31–35.
109. Id.
110. See supra text and notes 34–35.
111. See UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS, supra note 17.
112. See supra Part IV(A).
113. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION 1925–1950 (1987).
114. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Anchoring]; Martha A.
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010)
[hereinafter Responsive State]. See also EMORY UNIVERSITY, The Vulnerability and the
Human Condition Initiative, http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/ [https://perma.cc/CRS5-
ZP9E] (last visited Sep. 10, 2017) (describing a university project to publicize Professor
Fineman’s work and ideas). See also Martha A. Fineman, Fineman on Vulnerability and
Law, NEW LEGAL REALISM CONVERSATIONS (Nov. 30, 2015), https://newlegalrealism.word
press.com/2015/11/30/fineman-on-vulnerability-and-law/ [https://perma.cc/M2EQ-FPPF].
115. See, e.g., Responsive State, supra note 114, at 251–53.
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If a group, such as African Americans or aliens, requires heightened
judicial scrutiny, these scholars ask, why not protect them using the very
quality—their vulnerability—that calls for heightened solicitude?116 This
approach avoids line-drawing problems (who is a minority, anyway? how
about mixed-race people? the transgendered?).117 It also avoids the
charges of reverse discrimination that frequently accompany a decision to
distribute a coveted good, such as a seat at a prominent university, to a
minority at the expense of an equally or more deserving white.118 Courts
and other institutions adopting vulnerability as a criterion would simply
protect all those who, by reason of their circumstances, were found in
need of special consideration.119 Line-drawing problems would recede,
since most types of vulnerability are readily recognizable.120 One is either
weak, ill, young, disabled, or of minority race and lacking in resilience
right now, or not.121 And few people are likely to envy the vulnerable,
believe that they are getting away with something, and deem themselves
righteous when they organize to deprive them of an undeserved
handout.122
A. VULNERABILITY: TWO RESPONSES
As impressive as those advantages are, drawing attention to vulnerabil-
ity can lead to unintended effects. As Tereza learned with her photo-
graphs, fragility can elicit two responses, not just one.123 Pointing out that
a fellow citizen is at risk can motivate sympathetic onlookers124 to rush to
his or her aid.125 A child teeters on a cliff; everyone rushes to help guide
it to safety.126
But not in every case. As with a barnyard chicken with a speck of blood
that ends up pecked to death by its yard-mates, the sight of vulnerability
can elicit an aggressive reaction.127 (Naturalists and poultry farmers be-
lieve that this is an evolutionary response that enables the birds to thin
116. Anchoring, supra note 114, 1–2 (noting that vulnerability—the absence of resili-
ence—does not reside in fixed groups, such as minorities or children. Instead it arises from
an interaction between an individual and the social conditions in which she finds herself at
a particular time or moment in her life cycle).
117. E.g., Responsive State, supra note 114, at 253.
118. Id. at 275.
119. Id. at 253, 267–68.
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id. at 253–55.
122. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562–63 (2009) (discussing a challenge to a
fire department’s test procedures that made special concessions to minorities).
123. See supra text and notes 34–35.
124. That is, ones endowed with compassionate instincts—in short, social worker types.
125. See Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (“Danger invites rescue. The cry
of distress is the summons to relief.”). See also HENRY PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 51
(2d ed. 1955).
126. See Prosser, supra note 125.
127. See Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871,
877–78 (1994).
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the flock and eliminate the unfit).128 We all know how schoolyard bullies
can pick on a slightly built child, or one with crossed eyes, unfashionable
clothing, or a funny name or accent.129 Large nations can attack small
weak ones, unless, like Switzerland, they are bristling with underground
artillery emplacements and citizens who keep military rifles at home in
case of a national call-up.130 Corporate raiders look for slim pickings in
order to plan their next hostile takeover.131 And so on.
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the Czech citizens were at first
lighthearted. Music, operas, literature, and spas were their favorite leisure
time pursuits.132 For Tomas, it was all of these things, plus lovemaking.133
For the soulful Tereza, it was finding and fastening herself to a fascinating
and debonair man.134 For Sabina, it was creating large, impressive art
works while entertaining Tomas whenever he tired of innocent Tereza.135
Many Czechs enjoyed music and high culture while living in atmospheric
apartments in beautiful old neighborhoods in cities like Prague.136
What better target than a country like that for an expansion-minded
Russian regime? Sending the tanks in and overcoming the unarmed
crowd in the city center must have seemed like shooting fish in a barrel.
And so it was with advancing ADR, beginning with divorce mediation
and progressing to mandatory arbitration.137
1. Divorce Mediation
Family lawyers representing men were quick to pick up on its advan-
tages, confident that their peace-loving adversaries would be easily se-
duced (a second time, perhaps). They were. As mentioned, many women
readily agreed to divorce mediation, even after studies showed that it
worked to their disadvantage.138 It felt good. Even if my award ended up
on the low side, some women reasoned, at least everyone heard me
128. See id. at 878–79 n.56.
129. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, SPLC Survey: Presidential Campaign
Leading to Widespread Fear, Bullying in Schools (April 13, 2016), at https://www.splcenter
.org/news/2016/04/13/splc-survey-presidential-campaign-leading-widespread-fear-bullying-
schools [https://perma.cc/292A-5R8F].
130. See Clare Nullis, Long-Secret Forts Coming to Light in Switzerland, WASH. POST
(Oct. 20, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/10/20/long-secret-
forts-coming-to-light-in-switzerland/e43cc165-f485-4593-909b-cc84489c447f/?utm_term=.8c
a048fa0459 [https://perma.cc/DE7V-CZD4].
131. See Carl C. Icahn, BIO.COM, at http://www.biography.com/people/carl-c-icahn-9348
875 [https://perma.cc/EF7R-RNQF] (last updated Aug. 31, 2016) (describing the career of a
prominent corporate raider).
132. See UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS, supra note 17.
133. Supra text and notes 24–26, 32.
134. Id. at 25–26.
135. Id.
136. UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS, supra note 17.
137. See infra Part V(A)(1)–(2) (explaining this two-step process, which culminated in a
secret meeting of high-powered lawyers from major corporations).
138. That is, even allowing for the additional expense of the lawyer and filing costs, a
court-ordered award is generally higher than the one a woman might expect from media-
tion. See Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 523 (describing the ideology of divorce mediation
for women as seductive and insidious, even though the outcomes were often suboptimal);
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out.139 Like Tomas and Tereza, who returned from Switzerland to their
home country, “the land of the weak,”140 knowing full well the fate that
awaited them there, many clients will opt for mediation because it seems
familiar and easy to understand141 compared to the rapid-paced, high-
stakes atmosphere of a court, with lawyers and judges communicating in
an unfamiliar language.142
Tomas and Tereza found life in Geneva alienating and arduous.143
There the political regime was relatively free, but daily life was difficult.
They could secure only menial and unrewarding work. Once back home,
they found the situation little better.144 But at least it offered the appear-
ance of familiarity. Would they have done better had they stayed in their
new locale? Sabina certainly did. At the movie’s end, we see her in a
California seaside studio, apparently thriving. Studies of divorce media-
tion suggest that this holds true, as well, for disputants who pass up medi-
ation, summon their courage, consult a lawyer, and take their dispute to a
court.145
2. Commercial Arbitration
High-priced lawyers for retail marketers, automobile manufacturers,
the electronics industry, bankers, and financial executives were not far
behind. A recent series in The New York Times shows how this hap-
pened.146 It shows how mandatory consent-to-arbitration clauses have
begun appearing in form contracts in areas ranging from those mentioned
above, to nursing home agreements, funeral parlor arrangements, student
loan collection practices, and even employment contracts, where workers
suing for racial or sexual discrimination on the job find, to their surprise,
that the employment contract that they entered into years ago binds them
to take their grievance to an arbitration proceeding, not a court.147
Might it be that the arbitration boom, following on the heels as it did of
an early wave of mediation, came about precisely because gimlet-eyed
corporate lawyers in executive suits saw in mediation an early example of
what they could achieve for their corporate clients through mandatory
Process Dangers, supra note 7, at 1548 (noting that many women felt satisfied with the
experience of mediation and would recommend it to their friends).
139. See supra text and notes 79–81; Process Dangers, supra note 7, at 1563–69,
1585–96, 1610 (attributing this to the mediators’ skill and preference for compromise so
that disempowered parties end up acquiescing “in their own oppression”).
140. See supra text and notes 34–35.
141. Process Dangers, supra note 7, at 1547–50 (concluding that mediation is not the
“feminist alternative” that many think).
142. See Recent Books, supra note 2, at 146.
143. UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS, supra note 17. See supra text and notes 34–35.
144. See supra text and notes 34–35.
145. See supra Part III (reviewing outcome studies).
146. See supra notes 95, 97–106.
147. Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95 (discussing the growing use of such clauses
in employment contracts). See generally supra note 16 (describing the spread of ADR
generally).
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arbitration?148 Mediation, for some clients, is an enjoyable exercise, as it
is for some mediators who imagine themselves benefactors of the poor
and dispossessed, contributing to a more peaceful world.149 In their
mind’s eye, they are engaged in making the lion and the lamb lie down
together. What a wonderful role! Many of their clients even claimed to
like it and thanked them afterward.150
For many mediators and clients alike, mediation is “light.” It represents
peace, love, and a restoration of solidarity. And in some cases, that might
be true. Yet, might they not overlook the enterprise’s risks, unwittingly
introducing the current wave of mandatory arbitration with its even
greater dangers for consumers, workers, and practically everyone else? A
light, happy society like Czechoslovakia before the Russian invasion did
not see the danger coming, so that their only defenses against the Russian
tanks were rocks, and, in Tereza’s case, photographs sent to a foreign
newspaper.
Perhaps it behooves a weaker party to ask why the stronger one prefers
to proceed as it does. Perhaps it should set aside periods of sobriety, al-
ternating with the lightness they prefer as a daily diet. If they had done
so, Tomas and Tereza might have avoided a meaningless early death in a
dilapidated truck on a rainy day in the forest. By the same token, the
organized bar might have slowed the rush to alternative dispute resolu-
tion and preserved an age-old system of adjudication, with trials, high
stakes, tense stomach muscles, and the trappings of an adversary system
that, at times, worked just as theory suggested it should, rendering a fair
result for a disempowered litigant and making the one who injured him
pay full freight—not a compromised settlement that enables both parties
to walk away semi-satisfied.151
148. It would be hard for a hard-driving corporate lawyer not to have known how di-
vorce mediation could benefit a better-resourced male going through a high-stakes divorce.
At a minimum, such a lawyer would be likely to know about it from the old-boys grapevine
or the experience of friends. Or, perhaps he went through divorce proceedings himself and
saw the advantages of mediation close up. See Critical Reconsideration, supra note 21. Law-
yers have good memories for this sort of thing. See Arbitration Everywhere, supra note 95
(noting that “[t]he effort was led by a lawyer at . . . a Philadelphia firm that represented big
banks . . . [who] was searching for solutions when he remembered helping, as a young
lawyer . . . draft[ing] an arbitration clause . . . because ‘[c]lients . . . were getting killed by
frivolous lawsuits and asking what on earth could be done about it.’” The article goes on to
describe how he convened a meeting of like-minded corporate defense lawyers, including
ones from Bank of America, Chase, Citigroup, Discover, Sears, Toyota, and General Elec-
tric to promote his bright idea. Id. “At a subsequent teleconference, participants dialed in
remotely using an easy-to-remember code: a-r-b-i-t-r-a-t-i-o-n.” Id. Following that meeting
and “more than a dozen others over the next three years,” mandatory arbitration clauses
became “a means to an end . . . [namely] to kill class actions and send plaintiffs’ lawyers to
the ‘employment lines.’” Id. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 soon followed, suc-
ceeded by Supreme Court victories such as Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013). Id.
149. See supra text and notes 85, 89, 125.
150. See supra text and notes 80, 137; see infra 165. See also Hopes and Fears, supra
note 3, at 141 (noting that mediation seemed to morph into arbitration around 2012).
151. The victor, perhaps wearing a secret smile and issuing a sigh of relief at getting off
so easily.
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B. REASON FOR THE SECOND RESPONSE
What is it that calls up the second response—opportunism, seizing the
advantage over a weaker opponent—rather than compassion and fellow
feeling? With chickens and other barnyard animals, we know the an-
swer.152 With children who taunt and bully each other, too.153 With some
adults, sadism, schadenfreude, and sociopathy explain how some of our
fellow citizens seem missing in the consideration that we have come to
expect among normal people.154
But with corporations and other large institutions, this quality (consid-
eration) is much more likely to be absent than it is with individuals.155
Corporations generally act in their own best interest, with little considera-
tion for the broader social good.156 The bottom-line is profit. If the corpo-
ration injures some hapless consumer, or disappoints a long-term
employee (for example by firing the employee just before a pension kicks
in), that’s the breaks.157
No one expects the corporation to experience remorse, feel sorry, or
search its soul and resolve to act better next time. Human beings often
do. A late-arriving movie-goer steps on the toes of a seated patron while
sidling to his seat and says “sorry.” He does this automatically; it is, for
most of us, second nature. But large institutions are in most cases entirely
devoid of this inclination. They rarely apologize or express any other
emotion. They are “happy” only if the bottom-line—profit—is favorable
this quarter. The CEO breaks out a bottle of champagne and invites a few
of his staff into his office for a drink.158 If they do something reprehensi-
ble—contribute to global warming, say—they are sorry only if it injures
their image in the public eye or if a governmental regulator calls them to
152. See supra text and notes 126–1277.
153. They are immature beings whose social consciences are not fully developed. See
generally WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Coward-McCann, Inc., 1962); B.J.
Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, NCBI (July 21, 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2475802/ [Perma link unavailable].
154. On these unlovely traits, see Anthony P. Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object,
76 ORE. L. REV. 457 (1997); JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (Colum. U.
Press 1984) (1970).
155. On corporate capitalism, as devoid of an inherent moral impulse, see KARL MARX,
CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION (Penguin Classics, paper ed.
1991); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Bantam Classics, paper ed. 2002).
156. Marx, supra note 155; Smith, supra note 155. See also Nelson D. Schwartz & Alan
Rappeport, Call to Create Jobs, or Else, Tests Trump’s Sway, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/business/economy/trump-business-leaders-meetings-
ceos.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=b-
lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 [Perma link unavaila-
ble] (quoting a Harvard Business professor that “[g]lobal capital doesn’t have a social
conscience”).
157. On this common practice, see, e.g., Deborah L. Jacobs, 11 Sneaky Ways Companies
Get Rid of Older Workers, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
deborahljacobs/2013/11/03/11-sneaky-ways-companies-get-rid-of-older-workers/#43590ba6
206a [https://perma.cc/98P2-LRMH].
158. But probably not the secretary or foreman.
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task for it.159
With individual, flesh-and-blood mediators, the mechanism is a little
different from the one (lack of a conscience) that produces unfeeling cor-
porate behavior. That mechanism is a combination of mediation training
and group psychology, which enable many mediators to dismiss concerns
like the ones that the Fairness and Formality raised. The argument, even
reinforced by the empirical studies that followed, confronted old-fash-
ioned confirmation bias.160 If one’s world consists, in large part, of other
mediators trading tips and reading scholarly literature and CLE materials
on how to conduct a successful mediation, one is apt to give little atten-
tion to an argument that casts doubt on the enterprise as a whole.161
Trying to raise systemic questions with a successful divorce mediator
with a big caseload—or a large corporation that routinely inserts agree-
ments-to-arbitrate clauses in contracts, invoices, receipts, download apps,
and the like—can be a fruitless enterprise, what philosophers call a cate-
gory mistake.162 They—the corporation and the mediator—are not the
kind of entity that can exhibit that quality (empathy). The skeptical
reader is invited to pick up any casebook, symposium issue, or law review
article on alternative dispute resolution and look for the—usually very
short—section on critiques of the movement. There, buried in an obscure
footnote, one is apt to find a brief reference to Fairness and Formality,163
followed by a perfunctory question (how about this?) before going on to
discuss, say, polycentric disputes, the sort of thing that really matters in
that world.164
By the same token, ask a busy mediator if he has ever seen powerful
males summoning up their authority and privilege in the course of a di-
vorce mediation, causing the woman to fall silent, and looking up confi-
dently at the mediator for the expected approval. One will find that the
most common response is impatience and the insistence that his crowd is
aware of this problem and tries to ward it off by encouraging the woman
to speak up.165 And if one asks about studies showing that, despite it all,
women do worse in mediated divorce than in the litigated variety, holding
all factors constant, the answer is apt to be that that’s impossible—the
159. E.g., Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired Over 2 Million Phony Ac-
counts, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/
wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/ [https://perma.cc/EAC7-3WG6].
160. See, e.g., Shahram Heshmat, What Is Confirmation Bias?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr.
23, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirma-
tion-bias [https://perma.cc/WX9T-QB58] (explaining that it consists of interpreting new ev-
idence in line with one’s pre-existing beliefs—in short, “wishful thinking”).
161. Particularly if one’s livelihood depends on it.
162. See Definition of “category mistake,” OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddic
tionaries.com/definition/category_mistake [https://perma.cc/Q2HL-KSSU] (last visited
Sep. 10, 2017) (explaining that a “category mistake is the error of assigning to a thing or
person an attribute that cannot belong to that type of thing or person).
163. See generally Fairness and Formality, supra note 1.
164. See, e.g., Critics Gone?, supra note 16, at 1062–64 (noting the occasional brief,
perfunctory cite); Hopes and Fears, supra note 3, at 125 n.5 (providing an example of one).
165. That is, “we power-balance all the time.” See supra text and notes 54–55.
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investigators must have failed to take some important variable into ac-
count.166 Still others will fall back on satisfaction: “But my women clients
tell me afterward that they were happy with what I did.”167
One can easily leave such conversations with a strange feeling of dis-
connection from the other person. In some ways, the feeling resembles
Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard’s notion of le differend168—a state of affairs, simi-
lar to Emile Durkheim’s anomie169—that comes into play when a person
or group cannot see itself in the coercive language that another uses to-
ward or about it. The disaffected group cannot address its complaint, or
even pose it, in the language of the other. If it tries, the other will simply
not recognize what it is saying. Scholars critiquing ADR can easily find
themselves in this predicament.170
VI. FAIRNESS AND FORMALITY IN
21ST CENTURY AMERICA
The reader will recall that the Fairness and Formality critique turned
on (i) the connection between prejudice and informality; (ii) the observa-
tion, dating back to Gunnar Myrdal, that most Americans hold ambiva-
lent beliefs about race; and (iii) that they tend to hold these beliefs in
abeyance when in the presence of features (cues) in their surroundings
that remind them of the American Creed. The critique, of course, argued
for caution in relegating disempowered disputants to alternative forums.
Since the article appeared, new developments have complicated some of
our premises, while making critique even more urgent.
A. AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM: SOUTH AFRICA
UNDER APARTHEID
Changes in the political climate are starting to cast doubt not so much
on the fairness-and-formality critique itself, but on its application to con-
temporary America. In particular, Gunnar Myrdal’s observation about
the American Creed and most white citizens’ double value system (am-
bivalence) may have held true for liberal democracies like America in
mid-century,171 but does so less forcefully today. The basic value system
166. See Killing Softly, supra note 11, at 509–12 (noting the common belief that “power
balancing” covers all sins).
167. See supra text and note 138.
168. See JEAN-FRANC¸OIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 13
(Georges Van Den Abbeele trans. 1988) (1983); George A. Martinez, Philosophical Con-
siderations and the Use of Narrative in Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 684–85 (1999) (explain-
ing this concept).
169. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans.,
Free Press 1997) (1892) (considering the alienation of the working class).
170. See Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: What We Can Learn from
the Banking and Credit Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989,
1003 (2015) (observing “that middle-class parents model a sense that they are entitled to
have fair rules and procedures governing their experiences, to have the consequences of
their actions explained, and to have situations customized to their unique needs. These
habits are not equally present among the poor . . . .”).
171. See MYRDAL, supra note 58.
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(American Creed) has undergone subtle erosion so that our official poli-
cies and practices do not incline toward equality and fairness quite so
unequivocally as they once did.
Not all national creeds place racial fairness on a high pedestal. For ex-
ample, in South Africa during apartheid, the official values were overtly
racist.172 The national regime oppressed blacks and treated them as sec-
ond-class citizens. There, a black with a broken-down car could hope for
kindly treatment from a passing motorist or pedestrian more readily than
from a representative of the official regime.173 The same was true in the
American South during slavery and Jim Crow. An occasional white
Southerner might extend blacks a helping hand in situations where the
authorities were unlikely to do so.
The relationship between fairness and formality, in short, is contingent
and varies from society to society and from era to era. Our society, which
today embraces official neglect, deeming it virtuous “colorblindness,”174
and worries at least as much about reverse racism and quotas as about
relieving historical injustice,175 may well be approaching a point where, as
in South Africa, a disempowered minority citizen may hope for better
treatment from an informal source than from an official enforcing bru-
tally cool, uncaring laws and practices.176
If Myrdal’s observation no longer holds true as forcefully as it once did,
incorporating rules and physical reminders into a dispute resolution fo-
rum may no longer yield the same results.177 In short, official disputing
172. Ruling whites there, of course, did not see them that way. For them, their practices
were merely what the situation demanded. See, e.g., F.W. DE KLERK, THE LAST TREK: A
NEW BEGINNING (1998); Hirsh Goodman, Losing the Propaganda War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/sunday/how-israel-is-losing-the-
propaganda-war.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link unavailable] (noting how the country moved
masses of people to arid Bantustans and instituted a “pass system” to split families and
break down social structures “to provide cheap labor for the mines” and a plentiful supply
of servants for white homes and families).
173. See Goodbye to Hammurabi, supra note 2, at 772.
174. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1991) (noting the growing popularity of the color-blind metaphor).
175. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (discussing a recent Supreme Court
decision that evinced this concern).
176. Goodbye to Hammurabi, supra note 2, at 772; MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITE-
WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003) (noting that the myth of
colorblindness enables the majority to justify unfair regimes).
177. See supra text and note 146–1488 (describing how a group of high-paid lawyers
from various industries devised the tactic—mandatory arbitration clauses in form agree-
ments setting up various transactions). See Jessica Silver-Greenhouse & Michael Corkery,
In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-jus-
tice-system.html?mcubz=3 [Perma link unavailable] (noting that some predatory forms of
ADR have now effectively substituted themselves for the justice system). See also Ian
Lovett, Builders Pierce California’s Environmental Shield with New Weapon: The Ballot,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/builders-pierce-californi
as-environmental-shield-with-new-weapon-the-ballot.html?mcubz=3&mtrref=www.google
.com&gwh=3E7EFD3EAF277C633C034AB17E9202EA&gwt=pay [Perma link unavaila-
ble] (noting how developers often evade the justice system entirely by proceeding through
the initiative process) (“A Walmart spokeswoman . . . said the ballot initiative was ‘a way
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may be a less promising avenue for the disempowered litigant than it was
when we wrote Fairness and Formality.178 Of course, ADR may be in the
process of turning into a barren landscape for disempowered disputants
as well,179 so that both avenues are just as unpromising as, say, German
society was toward the Jews in the Third Reich, when both the state and
society at large were equally cold and hostile.180 If a trend of this sort is,
indeed, in process, merely channeling disputes among parties of different
levels of power and status to a relatively formal setting may be less help-
ful than it once was. Proceduralists may need to explore new approaches
entirely.
B. NORM THEORY: SECOND-CLASS TREATMENT FOR
SECOND-CLASS DISPUTANTS
A new mode of social analysis points in the same direction. Norm the-
ory holds, in essence, that our response to a person in need—in a predica-
ment of some sort—is a function of how normal or abnormal that
person’s predicament seems to us.181 We see starving villagers in a foreign
country on TV, but do not allow this to bother us excessively because we
reason that famines are common in that part of the world so that the
villagers must be used to it by now. By contrast, if our neatly dressed
next-door neighbor shows up at our doorstep saying that she and her chil-
dren are starving because her husband walked out on them, and she lost
her job and has not eaten in three days, we are immediately taken aback.
This is not supposed to happen in a nice neighborhood like ours. We fix a
sack of peanut butter sandwiches for her, and we give her some money
for gas and the address of a social service agency that can help her.182
On another occasion, we might be driving through the country when
we come across a family standing by a car on the side of the road with the
hood up. It is getting dark, and they look worried. But we drive on. The
family looked Mexican, and we reason that a lot of them live and work in
this area. Surely, a carload of their countrymen will come along before
long and stop to help. They all drive dilapidated cars like the roadside
family’s car and undoubtedly know how to fix them. They probably speak
better Spanish than we do, so that communication between them will go
more smoothly than it would if we were the ones stopping to help. So we
drive on.
to move the process forward,’ but she would not address whether the company was using
the process to avoid potential lawsuits.”).
178. See infra text and notes 187–1933 (discussing a number of retrenchments sug-
gesting that this is indeed the case today).
179. See supra Parts II–IV.
180. See infra text and notes 186–188.
181. See Richard Delgado, Four Reservations on Civil Rights Reasoning by Analogy:
The Case of Latinos and Other Nonblack Groups, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1896 (2012)
(explaining norm theory); Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing
Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136, 136 (1986).
182. See Delgado, supra note 181, at 1897.
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Finally, consider the fortunes of special education in the public schools.
To ease the burden for cognitively or developmentally disabled students
struggling to keep up in regular classrooms, Congress years ago enacted
the IDEA Act, which requires public schools to provide such students
individualized help and opportunities tailored to their needs.183 The Act
requires an expert investigation of each such child’s situation, a confer-
ence with the family, a formal hearing if both sides cannot agree to a joint
plan, and a written program that will enable the child to perform at his or
her highest possible level. Early assessment shows that programs of this
type, which are in effect in most advanced countries, perform well, but
only for white students.184 Students of color rarely receive enriched in-
struction but are relegated to tracks for slow learners and ones with dis-
ruptive behavioral problems. Many drop out as soon as they can.185 The
IDEA Act ends up increasing racial disparities in school achievement and
completion.186
Both considerations—norm theory and a general hardening of social
attitudes—suggest a degree of caution today that may have been unwar-
ranted when my co-authors and I wrote Fairness and Formality.187 Form
contracts, requiring that consumers, medical patients, and purchasers of
electronic hardware or apps submit their claims to arbitration, are mani-
festly unfair, since the arbitrators are often company shills and the con-
tracts bar class relief.188 Divorce mediation is probably just as poor a
choice for women as it was at the dawn of the ADR revolution. But the
advent of tort caps,189 stringent pleading rules,190 new limits on class ac-
tions,191 and legislative limits on recovery for medical malpractice and
even voting192 suggest that formal, in-court adjudication does not provide
the same opportunity for redress that it once did.193 For reasons that are
183. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2, 124 Stat.
2643 (2010). See also generally McMurtrey, supra note 16.
184. See, e.g., David Gillborn, Dis/ability as White Property: Race, Class and ‘Special
Education’ as a Racist Technology, in WORLD YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION 2017, ASSESS-
MENT INEQUALITIES 104, 105 (Julie Allan & Alfredo J. Artiles eds., 2017).
185. See id. at 113–16.
186. Id.
187. Viz, 1985.
188. See supra text and notes 56, 100.
189. See Jeffrey A. Krawitz, New Study Reveals Caps on Damages are Potentially Ruin-
ing the Healthcare Industry, NAT. L. REV. (July 27, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/new-study-reveals-caps-damages-are-potentially-ruining-healthcare-industry [https:/
/perma.cc/8XDK-SV8W]. See also George A. Martinez, Further Thoughts on Race, Ameri-
can Law, and the State of Nature: Advancing the Multiracial Paradigm Shift and Seeking
Patterns in the Area of Race and Law, 85 UMKC L. REV. 105, 110–16 (2016) (noting this
and other changes in procedural law that operate to the disadvantage of disempowered
litigants).
190. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1043–44
(2016).
191. Id. at 1037–38.
192. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 440 (2010); Shelby
Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013).
193. On some of these measures, see Critics Gone?, supra note 16, at 1056–57; Marti-
nez, supra note 189, at 110–16 (2016) (noting changes in procedural law that operate to the
detriment of disempowered litigants).
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not completely clear, we normalize the predicament of poor people seek-
ing relief from corporate villainy. We reason that this sort of thing hap-
pens all the time. We arrange that they lose—in court, or anywhere else.
Courts and other means for adjudicating disputes originated centuries
ago as measures by which the King could assure peace in his realm and
discourage his subjects from seeking private revenge. If the two main ave-
nues our society offers for such relief—formal, in-court adjudication, and
ADR—are poor guarantors of a fair hearing, it may be time to begin
pondering new means by which poor disputants, at least, may achieve
official relief. Otherwise, we may find ourselves driving down a forest
road on a rainy night, oblivious to the fate that awaits us in a deteriorat-
ing world.194
194. See supra text and notes 35–36, explaining how the story of Tereza and Tomas
comes to an end.
